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This paper studies the impact of electricity deregulation and restructuring on research and 
development (R&D) expenditures of investor owned utilities. The differing pace of deregulation 
in the fifty states provides heterogeneity in institutional structure and competitive forces, and 
showcases the response of R&D funding to changing institutional environments. Based on a 
panel of all major investor-owned utilities from 1989-1997, this paper analyzes various political 
constraints, institutional change, and firm-specific financial and structural factors that have 
contributed to the decline of R&D expenditure in the U.S. electric utility industry. R&D is 
modeled as a two-stage process where firms first decide whether to invest in research depending 
on their critical mass and state characteristics, and then conditional on a positive decision, decide 
on the level of expenditure. A variation of the Heckman model is estimated in a panel data 
setting, allowing for separate effects of selection and intensity. The primary findings are: First, 
greater deregulation and competition has a positive effect on R&D whereas a higher probability 
of deregulation adversely affects research spending. The start date for retail competition and 
level and policies for stranded cost recovery do affect spending. Second, the response of R&D to 
financial and other firm attributes varies with the state of deregulation and provides insights into 
firm behavior in a regulated context. Third, the institutional and competitive factors interact in a 
way that suggest that full deregulation, coupled with effective retail competition may mitigate 
the problem of declining electricity R&D by the utilities. 
 
Key Words: Electricity Deregulation, Competition, R&D 
JEL Codes: O30, O31, L50, L94, L97 
                                                           
* We would like to thank all the participants of NBER productivity seminar, International Organization Conference 
and the 24
th Annual North American Conference of USAEE/IAEE for their thoughtful and constructive comments. 
This paper was vastly enriched by comments from Steve Puller, as well. Thanks also go to David Popp, whose 
comments on a related paper helped shape this one as well. We would also like to thank David Brownstone and 
Justin Tobias for their help regarding all aspects of the paper. All errors are ours alone. “Research and development is our nation’s investment in its own future. America’s science and 
technology base may well stand as our most important renewable resource. The overarching 
public goal of US R&D policy, of which energy R&D is a major component, must be to assure 
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1
Introduction 
Throughout the course of history, investments in research and development (R&D) 
activities have been rooted in the belief that generous R&D funding leads to economic progress 
through technological innovations. As early as the 1940's economists pointed out that invention 
and technical progress were the true engines of economic growth and R&D was their primary 
fuel (Schmookler, 1966). This view was further reinforced when the precipitous decline in 
private industrial R&D expenditure in the early 1970's was followed by a productivity slowdown 
in the US from 1977-1981. 
For electric and electric equipment, total R&D as a percent of sales, has declined from 
7.9 in 1986 to 6.9 in 1996. The Department Of Energy’s funding has decreased by 3 percent 
between1993 and 1999. State electricity R&D funding has declined by 30 percent during the 
same period.
2 R&D funding by the electric utilities has fallen by 33 percent to about $476 
million between 1993 and 1998. EPRI’s (Electric Power Research Institute) budget has also 
dropped by 71 percent because of fall in contribution from major utilities.
3 If this trend continues, 
this “would result in slowing technology development, sacrificing future prosperity to meet 
short-term goals, and failing to meet national energy goals” (GAO/RCED-96-203). The 
                                                           
1 Final Report of the Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development, Secretary of Energy Advisory 
Board, U.S. Department of Energy, June 1995.  
2 EPRI (1997), GAO (1998) 
  2magnitudes of these changes are alarming and raise questions about the factors behind the 
decline and mitigating factors that may stem this. This has focused attention on the changing 
institutional and market environment in the US electricity industry and their influence on the 
conduct of R&D. 
Considerable theoretical and empirical attention has been focused on the linkages 
between market structures, innovation, productivity and R&D.
4 Particular industries like 
telecommunications and electronics have been studied extensively to examine the role of various 
institutional and firm specific factors in the conduct of research in these industries. However, 
relatively little attention has been devoted to the impact of restructuring on R&D activities in the 
electric utility industry. Restructuring is likely to lead to substantial changes in the structure and 
conduct of R&D, particularly regarding investments in science, long-term projects, and projects 
involving environmental benefits that cannot be internalized.  Thus it is important to analyze 
how various market and non-market forces interact in the deregulated environment to impact 
research expenditure by utilities. 
This paper focuses on the total research expenditure by investor owned utilities (IOUs). It 
analyzes how ongoing deregulation, changing market arrangements and the expectation of future 
retail competition affect the R&D response of utilities. It also studies whether firm characteristics 
and financial factors have a differential impact after deregulation. This paper is organized into 
five sections. The first section briefly outlines the deregulation process and the nature and 
organization of R&D activities in this US power industry. The second section explains the 
incentives to conduct R&D in a regulated and market framework and the R&D model. 
Methodological issues, data sources and the specifics about variables used in the R&D model are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 GAO (Appendix II, 1996), Moore (1995) 
  3presented in the third section. The fourth section explains the empirical results and the last 
section concludes. 
Section 1: Background 
The Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 gave impetus to wholesale power competition 
by creating a new class of power producers called the exempt wholesale generators (EWGs) and 
creating open-access transmission grids for wholesale transactions. In 1995, FERC Orders 888 & 
889
5 encouraged retail competition for the first time, while furthering wholesale competition
6. 
Restructuring involves two main phenomena - divestiture and merger. In the US power sector 
there has been a large number of voluntary and mandatory divestitures of generating capacity by 
IOUs. States promoted this trend because the simultaneous ownership of generation and 
transmission capacity by the same company could lead to discrimination against third parties 
who wanted to use their transmission networks. 
All these changes point to a very different structure of the power industry
7 than that of the 
traditional regulated monopoly (Blumstein, 1997; Blumstein & Bushnell, 1994; Borenstein, & 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 For a complete discussion on this topic please refer to Kamien & Schwartz (1975) - "Market Structure & 
Innovation: A Survey", JEL, 13:1. 
5 Order 888 – “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Service 
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities” and Order 889 – 
“Open-Access Same-Time Information System”. For a detailed provision of the orders please refer to DOE/EIA 
(1997) 
6 The main provisions of Order 888 are that utilities that own transmission networks must provide transmission 
services to other power generators at cost-based non-discriminatory prices. Provisions were also laid out governing 
the recovery of stranded costs by utilities. Order 889 required each public utility to participate in an Open Access 
Same-Time Information System (OASIS), to facilitate wheeling by third parties that did not own transmission 
capacities. These orders taken together provided impetus to wholesale competition and initiated an effective 
groundwork to begin retail wheeling; whereby retail consumers could shop around for the best rates while 
purchasing power much like the present telecom situation. 
7 Currently there are about 3200 electric utilities in the US of whom only about 700 generate power. In the 
generation sector there are two broad groups – the utilities and the non-utilities. The utilities consist of the five 
distinct groups, the investor owned utilities (IOUs), federally owned utilities, other public utilities (state, municipal 
etc.) and co-operatives and power marketers. The non-utility group comprises qualified and non-qualified 
cogenerators, small power producers, exempt wholesale generators and non-qualified non-cogenerators. The non-
utilities are “privately owned entities that generate power for their own use and/or sale to utilities and others” 
  4Bushnell, 1997; Bushnell & Stoft 1995; Hogan, 1997; Jordan, 1994; Joskow, 1989, 1997, 1999; 
Moyer, 1993; Sloan, 1994; Smith, 1998; Taylor, 1998; Wolak, 1997). Presently there are 244 
IOUs in the US and they operate in all states except Nebraska. They are for-profit privately 
owned entities who have service monopolies in particular geographical regions. In this paper we 
shall concentrate on the IOUs as they are major power generators and account 90 percent of all 
electricity research undertaken by power producers. 
There are four major entities that carry out research in the power industry related research 
– the IOUs, DOE, EPRI and manufacturers of electrical equipment such as General Electric. In 
this paper, we are interested in analyzing direct electricity research in areas such as generation 
and transmission by the utilities – since these were the entities most directly affected by the 
deregulation and restructuring process. R&D was primarily conducted by big vertically 
integrated firms that owned generation, transmission and distribution. Companies that were 
solely distribution or transmission companies, invested very little in research. 
In the regulated environment, R&D investment was essentially costless and riskless to the 
utilities. All such investments could be recouped from the ratepayers by means of a cost pass-
through; if the Public Utility Commission approved. With deregulation, gaining a competitive 
advantage through investment in strategic research is going to be in the forefront. Industry 
watchers and analysts believe that this will decrease overall investment in R&D and 
collaborative research and classic “public interest” R&D will suffer (Hirsch, 1998; Testimony, 
1998). On the other hand, investment from alternative sources may increase innovations. 
Competition may provide the necessary thrust to electricity research and result in the birth of 
new technology (R. W. Shaw’s - Testimony, 1998). Individual states display differential decline 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(DOE/EIA-X037, 2000).  The investor owned utilities are the most important category and they account for 75 
percent of power generated in the US. 
  5patterns (Graph 1(b)), although total R&D trends (Graph 1(a)) display a steady decline after the 
start of 1993. 
However, at least temporarily, R&D spending of companies has been adversely affected 
by deregulation (Blumstein, 1997). Most of the concern about utility R&D seems to be regarding 
the “R” part. The development and demonstration parts are expected to fare no worse in the 
deregulatory regime. In fact, in terms of innovation and returns on R&D expenditure, efficiency 
may be boosted since the utilities will not have a guarantee of recouping all their R&D 
investments and may choose their projects accordingly. There is major concern, however, about 
the basic research part since utilities had invested huge resources in both long-term and “public 
interest” research
8. 
Section 2: Layout of the R&D Model 
Section 2.1: R&D under Regulation 
This discussion suggests two potential types of R&D programs for regulated monopolies.  
Under “regulatory lag” conditions, a company might perform R&D in order to improve operating 
efficiencies, consistent with the notion that its incentives are aligned with those of private firms 
when not subject to rate reviews.  But the incentive to perform R&D under these conditions is 
weak.
9  As is discussed above, electric utilities had franchise monopolies that not only protected 
their activities from interlopers (obviating the basic Schumpeterian reason for conducting 
research), but also circumscribed their own business undertakings.  Their ability to exploit 
research results is consequently limited. 
                                                           
8 Some examples are: investigation of the formation of nitrogen oxide in burners, preventing electricity loss through 
leakage in residential heating and cooling ducts etc. 
9  During the 20
th century, electricity technology underwent enormous technological advance, and regulated utilities 
are credited with providing a stable, forgiving environment ideal for inducing innovation (of at least some types) 
from manufacturing firms.  This is clearly an important aspect in the role of regulation more generally in innovation, 
but beyond the scope of this paper.  See Ishii (2003) for a related analysis. 
  6Even when formal rate hearings lag company decisions, regulated utilities operate in a 
shadow of potential regulatory oversight that darkens prospects for R&D.  R&D is risky, with 
the risk justified by infrequent but valuable inventions.  But if a utility succeeded in producing, 
say, some cost reducing innovation, regulators would likely take notice and redistribute 
exceptional returns to rate-payers.  Our data series does not include years during which utilities 
allegedly enjoyed regulatory lags, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they did not devote 
unsupervised surplus to the pursuit of research.
10
The second reason a regulated utility would have a research program is by order, or 
anticipated order, of its regulatory commission.  In this case, we would expect the program to 
reflect preferences of the commissioners.  The discussion above yields some suggestions about 
how such a program might differ from that of market firms.  Schumpeterian analysis predicts that 
when firms face a relatively elastic demand curve, they will perform more R&D.
11
Section 2.2: R&D under Deregulation 
The process of deregulation is far from complete. This implies that uncertainty will play a 
major role in a firm’s research investment decisions, although apriori, its impact on R&D 
investment is ambiguous. For example: uncertainty over demand conditions may affect the 
timing of an investment or the choice of technology.
12  In the electricity industry, for instance, 
technologically advanced gas generating plants exhibit a tradeoff between the efficiency at which 
the plant converts fuel to power (the heat rate), and the speed at which it can adjust its output (the 
ramp rate).  Which factor is more valuable depends on market conditions: if demand is 
                                                           
10 In contrast, AT&T, while holding down a regulated monopoly on phone service, conducted an extraordinarily 
successful research program and was among the world’s top annual patent recipients.  Neither the electric utilities, 
nor, prior to 1990, their research consortium, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) obtained patents on 
inventions.  See Hirsh (1989); Corey (1997). 
11  Reinganum (1989).  The intuition is that a small success – and small price decrease – will secure for the firm a 
large number of new customers. 
12  See Ishii and Yan (2003), Macauley (2003), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Kort (2003). 
  7predictable and sales contracts are long-term, a generating plant with a higher heat rate would be 
optimal. If the actual nature of the market is unknown, efficient investment principles dictate a 
delay in investment.  This spills over to R&D to the extent that research is conducted in response 
to demand for technology, or "induced demand" R&D.
13  Thus we expect uncertainty to dampen 
R&D expenditures.  
However, there are forces that work in the opposite direction.
14  Research activities in a 
firm increase its ability to absorb the research results of others, or its ability to innovate in areas 
related to, but distinct from, the firm's own research project.
15  Since deregulation causes 
obsolescence of current plant, and some new technology will be desired, the transition period 
may be characterized by increases in R&D at the generic end of the spectrum.  Second, R&D can 
be a hedge.  A firm may choose to conduct research on both generating options, and thus 
increase the research budget during the investment delay.  How important this effect is depends 
on the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and on the research production function.  If 
research is in part generic (potentially applying to both options), or if there are high fixed costs to 
research,
16 the hedging characteristic may dominate the incentive to delay.  Third, if a firm 
delays ordinary investment, it may face fewer budget constraints for other activities.  R&D can 
substitute for investment if it places the firm in a position to invest more rapidly in new 
technology once the optimal investment strategy is revealed. 
Section 2.3: R&D Model 
Expenditure decisions on research and development projects by a firm are viewed as a 
two-step process. First a utility decides whether to invest in R&D or not depending on its 
                                                           
13  Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999). 
14  A theoretical treatment of some of these issues is presented in Kort (2003). 
15  Dosi (1988) and references cited therein. 
  8expected future benefits from R&D. Benefits in this case do not just imply monetary profits. In a 
regulated regime, a firm could invest in R&D to gain favor with the regulators or to gain some 
cost advantage. Thus the first stage decision depends on the nature of the regulatory commission, 
profits, the generation technology e.g. hydro or fossil fuel, the size of the firm and whether it is a 
Yankee company. If the PUC’s main objective was to keep electricity prices under check, it may 
not push large R&D spending, leading IOUs to refrain from R&D spending. A Yankee company 
would spend almost nothing on R&D as they are subsidiaries of other IOUs and the research 
would be done by the parent company. A low-technology hydro-electric utility, again, would not 
invest in R&D.  
We estimate the selection equation using a random effects probit model in a panel data 
setting. The latent unobserved variable is net revenue stream. Each year the firm decides to 
invest in research if such investment is associated with positive net revenues (yit). Thus the 
decision is modeled as: 
otherwise   0   and   0,   y   if      1
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where: uit is the random error term
17 independent of xit, which are the vector of covariates 
mentioned above.  
The second stage is observed conditional on participation in research activities. Market 
structure and expectations influence R&D spending by changing the institutional environment 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16  R&D activities tend to be very stable over time, an effect believed due to the high fixed costs of assembling a 
research staff and the very low value of the staff in any alternate use.  See Hall (2002). 
17 We assume that the random effects (ui) follows a normal distribution N(0, σ
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(Φ is the cumulative normal distribution). This model is calculated using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
  9within which firms operate. Financial factors like the magnitude of profits determine the amount 
of resources that a firm has for investing in research projects. Small investments in R&D 
generally do not yield results. Thus the size of the firm determines whether it has the critical 
mass to succeed at a research project. The nature of the firm also critically influences R&D. All 
these factors are incorporated in the second stage model where the dependent variable is positive 
R&D spending. This is estimated by an error components model




















where: Mit is a vector of institutional variables, Fit denotes firm specific characteristics like 
profit, Zi comprises individual firm characteristics that vary between firms but not by year. 't' is a 
time trend and T are year dummies. In addition, institutional and market forces may have 
differing effects on R&D under a regulated and a competitive environment. To take this effect 
into account we interact a subset of the firm characteristics with a dummy (D1993) that takes the 
value 1 if year >=1993 and 0 otherwise
19. 
Section 3: Data Issues 
Section 3.1: Data on R&D Expenditures 
The key source of data for this paper is Form 1, which regulated IOUs file with Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). It contains data on all financial aspects such as debt, 
                                                           
18 . The error has two components: vi - the random disturbance that varies by group but not over time (vi ~ N(0, σ
2
v)) 
and εit - is the idiosyncratic error component (εit ~ N(0, σ
2
ε). We assume that Xit and vi are uncorrelated. In the actual 
estimation process, the dependent variable and some of the regressors are in logs. This arises from an underlying 
non-linear model where some variables affect R&D expenditure in an exponential manner while others serve to shift 
the distribution. 
19 These interaction terms denote how important each effect is post 1992. The interpretation of the coefficients is as 
follows: For pre-1992, the marginal effects are denoted by the coefficients of the explanatory variables. For post-
1992, the marginal effects are denoted by coefficient of variable + coefficient of interaction term if the interaction 
term is significant. Otherwise the explanatory variable has the same marginal effect pre and post 1992. 
  10revenue, equity; generation data, such as amount of electricity produced from steam, nuclear, 
hydro; customer data about the share of sales and revenue of residential, commercial and 
industrial customers and expenditure data like R&D, wages and salaries etc. The R&D 
expenditure data for 1990-1998 was obtained from FERC’s online Form 1 database. Data for 
1989 was collected from the original company filings. The revenue, customer information and 
generation data is from two sources – post 1990 it was obtained from Form 1 while 1989 is from 
the EIA (Energy Information Administration) publication “Financial Statistics of the Major 
Investor Owned Utilities”. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1(a). 
Our main focus is to study the effect of deregulation and restructuring on various 
components of R&D expenditure. To facilitate this and to observe whether there was a 
fundamental change in the conduct of research after deregulation we use data for the period 
1989-1997
20, for all major utilities (199 of them). There is also a problem of missing data. For 
about 25 companies R&D expenditure data is unavailable for 1989 and a couple of the pre-1993 
years. For a few companies where data was missing in a mid-year we imputed the data by trend 
fitting. But such imputed data does not constitute more than five percent of the entire data set. 
Merger of companies also contribute to the unbalanced nature of the panel. 
Section 3.2: Market Institution Variables 
Deregulation Variable 
Over the past several years the electric utility industry has been in a state of flux. 
Deregulation, mergers, acquisitions and divestitures have dramatically changed the landscape of 
the industry. Each state is at a different level of deregulation and restructuring. Any one variable 
                                                           
20 Although available, we do not use post 1997 data as it contains a downward bias for the R&D expenditure data.  
Around 1998, big R&D spenders like Southern California Edison divested their generation assets, concentrated on 
distribution and transmission, cut back research spending and spawned private entities (like Mission Electric), which 
  11is not adequate to capture the dynamic nature of this change. Thus we use five variables that, we 
believe, characterize the change to a large extent, within the constraints imposed by the data. 
One of the primary variables of interest is the status of deregulation in different states. 
The decline in R&D expenditure that has accompanied the deregulation process would imply 
that it has had a negative impact on research spending by IOUs. In the regulated regime, firms 
often invested in R&D following the implicit dictates of the regulators. If we ignore government 
failure models and consider regulators to be social utility maximizers then it stands to reason that 
the R&D undertaken under the regulated regime will be optimal for society. Anytime, we move 
away from it, firms will either under or over-invest in research. 
We use a dynamic deregulation index to capture the different stages. This traces the path 
through which the states traveled to reach their current status. The dynamic index is constructed 
from EIA’s publication “Status of State Electric Industry restructuring Activity as of May 
2000”
21. This index is coded as zero for ‘No Activity’, 1 for ‘Investigations Ongoing or Orders 
and Legislation Pending’, 2 for ‘Order Issued for Retail Competition’ and 3 for ‘Legislation 
Enacted to Implement Retail Access’. This index is zero for those states that have not taken any 
action about deregulation till 1997. Table 1(b) shows the status of deregulation in 1997. 
However, deregulation did not happen overnight, and the deregulation index alone will 
not capture the impact of regulatory changes on research expenditures. Discussion about 
deregulation preceded the passing of EPAct in 1992 and firms would have formed expectations 
about the status of deregulation in their state in years to come and tailored its R&D investment 
accordingly. To capture this forward-looking behavior, we use the predicted probability of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would now do the bulk of its R&D. Since these companies are not under FERC jurisdiction, they do not need to file 
Form 1. Thus data is unavailable. So we restrict our sample to 1989-1997. 
21 This publication outlines the regulatory orders, legislations and the investigative studies that have been undertaken 
by each state till present. 
  12deregulation in a state in 1998, based on state characteristics such as the price, presence of 
municipal power plants etc
22. This variable captures the fact that if a firm expects a state to be 
deregulated in the near future, then it may start cutting back on its R&D spending even before 
the actual order was passed. This is a state level variable and we assume that there is no 
asymmetric information between firms. Thus they all have the same expected probability of 
deregulation.  
In addition we use the permitted level of stranded cost recovery to capture another facet 
of deregulatory activity. It is conceivable that an IOU in a state which allows hundred percent 
recovery through, say, a wire charge, will decrease its R&D budget by less than one where full 
recovery is not allowed or there is uncertainly about the recovery mechanism. So far only 14 
states have taken steps to mandate the level of permitted stranded cost recovery and its 
composition. We use data from DOE/EIA to generate an indicator variable that takes values from 
0 to 3 (increments of 0.5) and denotes the level of stranded cost recovery
23. 
Competition Variables 
To effectively capture competition in a state, we use two primary variables. These are – 
the mandated start date of retail competition and the percentage of customers eligible for retail 
                                                           
22 This probability of deregulation is obtained from modeling deregulation in a state. The deregulation model is 
based on the economic and political factors that affect the pace of deregulation in a state. As the dependent variable 
we consider the status of electricity deregulation in a state at the end of 1998. The independent variables (price, 
import and export price gap, weighted standard deviation on prices, share of municipal power entities in state, power 
of industrial and other customer groups, LCV rating) are from 1993 – before EPACT had any significant influence. 
The model is estimated as an ordered probit and predicted probabilities of deregulation are generated from this. This 
variable captures the single realization of a firm’s expectation about full deregulation (index =3) being achieved in 
the state in 1998 based on the information in 1993. It is zero before 1993, takes the constant probability value from 
the model for all periods after 1993 until deregulation index=3. Once the state reaches full deregulation 
(deregulation index=3) this variable takes the value 1. 
23 This variable takes the value 0 if there is no recovery mechanism in place, 1 if such a mechanism is in place, but 
full recovery not guaranteed and varies with individual utility and depends on its mitigation efforts or on divestiture 
of generation assets, 1.5 if just & reasonable stranded costs can be recoverable, and appropriate consumer safeguards 
related to stranded costs are implemented, 2 if there is an opportunity to recover prudently incurred stranded costs, 
2.5 if in addition to prudently incurred stranded cost the utility can fully recover nuclear stranded costs and 3 if there 
is opportunity for full recovery of all stranded costs.   
  13competition. The number of years that a state has to graduate to full retail competition may affect 
its R&D spending. Even if the deregulation order has been passed, each state has its own time 
frame by which it operates. Two states may have passed a deregulatory order but one may 
mandate that retail competition start twenty years from now and the other may mandate retail 
competition immediately. Presumably firms will behave differently in the two situations. Apriori, 
the effect on research spending is not clear. An IOU may invest more or less depending on its 
perception of uncertainty. We hypothesize that that greater the number of years left till the start 
of retail competition, the lower will be the R&D spending, due to greater uncertainty that is 
involved in a longer time horizon. A firm which has to embark on retail competition, say in two 
years, will not cut back its R&D by as much as such an action may have adverse consequences 
on its competitive advantage in the market. 
So far 18 states have set concrete dates for the start and phasing in of full retail 
competition. For states that have not set a date, we assume that they have 20 years till retail 
competition begins (i.e., at any point of time, their expected start date is 20 years in the future). 
For the states with a specific start date, this variable takes the value: start-date of retail 
competition minus current year if and only if deregulation index is greater then zero. This 
variable is bounded below at zero and bounded above at 20
24. For a summary of the mandated 
dates please refer to Table 1(c). 
Passing a deregulatory order, or even mandating the date for the start of retail 
competition is not sufficient to engender effective competition in the market. For example, a 
state may be deregulated but lack of competitors, or customers eligible to switch to other 
companies may imply low levels of actual competition. When there is effective competition in a 
state, utilities would increase at least a section of their research spending that is directly related 
  14to gaining market share or increasing profits. To measure competition we use the percent of 
customers who are eligible to choose a provider. This is essential to the development of retail 
energy competition and its maturation because the greater the percentage of eligible customers, 
the greater the potential competition. This is particularly important as an explanatory variable for 
R&D as research expenditures are essentially forward looking and a firm that knows that its 
entire market will be open to competition a few years down the line, it may behave very 
differently from another whose market is fairly protected despite deregulation. 
Section 3.3: Firm and Regulator Characteristics 
Firm Characteristics 
To measure the financial health of the firm we use the bond rating of utilities. A better 
bond rating also implies that a firm will have higher chances of borrowing money cheaply in the 
market. Thus availability of increased low cost resources may have a positive effect on R&D. 
The bond rating goes from AAA+, AAA, AAA-, AA+ to below C. This has been converted to an 
18 point scale where AAA+ corresponds to 18 and below B- corresponds to zero
25.  
For the power industry, the nature and type of firm would critically affect the amount of 
R&D investment. A hydro-electric plant, traditionally a low-technology operation, would invest 
less or nothing at all in research when compared to nuclear or fossil fuel plants. The share of 
fossil fuel in the generation mix, share of purchase to generation and resale share may all affect 
how firms respond to deregulation. In addition, firms have to be a critical minimum size to 
effectively undertake research. The yearly operating revenues (1996 dollars) of each company 
are used as a proxy for firm size. However, we are agnostic about the size elasticity of R&D – 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Sensitivity analysis shows that the choice of 20 years does not affect the results. 
25 Companies that have no long-term debt have no bonds. They have been coded to missing for now - until an 
acceptable solution is found for including them in the data set. 
 
  15we have no apriori reason to suspect that this will be greater, equal to or less than one. The ratio 
of purchase to generation is used an indicator for the type of firm – to indicate whether its main 
operations lie in generation or elsewhere. We also include a dummy for steam plants as a proxy 
for firm type. All the generation and revenue data are from the “Financial Statistics of Major 
Investor Owned Utilities” published by the Energy Information Administration annually. 
Regulator Nature 
R&D investment decision by utilities is influenced by its internal profit motive, nature of 
its operations as well as implicit regulatory pressure. The external pressure is captured by the 
variable denoting the nature of the Public Utility Commission (PUC). A higher score for PUC 
nature implies that the regulators are more pro-active than those in other states and IOUs in such 
states may be pressured to invest more in research. This variable is constructed from the 
regulatory history of the state outlined in Anderson (1981, pp. 82-83). It traces out the status of 
electric rate structure reform in the fifty states and DC in 1977, which gives us a clear picture of 
the ‘progressive’ regulators.  This reform was characterized by four indicators – generic rate 
hearings, FEA funded experiments, lifeline or inverted rates and time-of-day rates. We create an 
indicator variable using this information. A state is given 1 point for implementing each of the 
above reform mechanisms. So the highest point on the scale is 4 and the lowest 0
26. For a 
detailed table of this variable please refer to Table 1(d). 
Section 4: Empirical Results 
The R&D model consists of data for 9 years and 190 IOUs. The panel is unbalanced due 
to missing data and mergers. In addition, 27 percent of total R&D expenditure is zero. As 
                                                           
26 California is a 4 on this scale while Alabama is a 0. 
  16discussed earlier, the decision to perform R&D is modeled as a two-stage process
27 estimated by 
an approximation of the Heckman procedure. In the first stage the firm decides whether it should 
engage in research and development or not
28. The second level decision involves determining the 
optimal amount of R&D expenditure that would maximize the present discounted value of the 
firm's value function subject to various institutional and revenue constraints.  
Section 4.1: Basic Model 
Stage 1: Selection Equation (Table 2(a)) 
Results for the first stage selection equation are shown in Table 2(a). The decision to 
conduct research depends crucially on the nature and structure of the firm and political factors as 
well. First, we find that resources of the firm have positive effect on R&D – the higher the 
operating revenues the more likely it is for a firm to conduct R&D, supporting the ‘deep pocket’ 
theory of R&D. Share of generation in total sales does not affect the R&D decision, while 
utilities that generate a larger portion of their power from hydro sources are less likely to invest 
in any research as this is low-tech and further efficiency improvement or cost decrease may not 
be feasible. Pending mergers make research investment unlikely, as firms want to reduce 
discretionary expenditures during states of uncertainty. In addition, the probability of IOUs 
investing in R&D is higher the more pro-active a PUC is in that state. To summarize, a company 
with a low hydro generation, high operating revenues, with no mergers in the horizon and 
located in a pro-active state has a higher probability of investing in R&D. 
 
 
                                                           
27 In this case a tobit model would be inappropriate as it does not make a distinction between the two stages and 
treats all zeros as levels. 
28 In my panel there are 19 IOUs that switch between conducting and not conducting R&D between 1989-1997. For 
the rest the decision remains unchanged throughout this period. 
  17Stage 2: Determinants of Positive Total R&D (Table 2(b) & (c)) 
Next we investigate the determinants of R&D levels. Table 2(b) and (c) provide the basic 
results for the second stage of the model. The dependent variable is the log of positive real total 
R&D (1996 dollars). To account for selection, we include a polynomial of the probability of 
selection from the first stage
29. Other explanatory variables are divided into three main sub-
groups - the market institution variables, firm characteristics and state and year variables. We 
observe that the issue of selection is important (the coefficients on all the terms of predicted 
probability of a positive outcome is significant at 5 percent) and that indeed a two-stage model is 
warranted instead of a tobit specification.  
Before we estimate the full model outlined earlier, we first investigate whether the regime 
change after EPAct had a significant impact on R&D. Thus we estimate a simple difference-in-
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In this model D1993 is the after EPAct dummy
31, the treated group are all IOUs in states that had 
shown some deregulatory activity
32 by 1996 and θ is the difference-in-difference coefficient. If 
deregulation and its associated changes were indeed responsible for the sharp decline in R&D 
spending by IOUs, we would expect θ to be negative and significant. From table 2(b) we find 
that θ is indeed negative and significant (-0.202) and IOUs in deregulated states experience a 
significant decline in R&D after 1992 when compared to their counterparts in other states. 
                                                           
29 This is an approximation for the Mill's ratio. 
30 Fit denotes firm specific characteristics like profit, Zi comprises individual firm characteristics that vary between 
firms but not by year. 't' is a time trend and T are year dummies. 
31 EPAct was passed in 1992. Therefore, D1993=1 if year>=1993 
32 The deregulatory index for these states was at least 1 by 1996, i.e. they had investigations ongoing or had orders 
and legislation pending. 
  18However, this simple specification fails to capture the various facets of deregulation. After 1992 
states differed not only in their pace of deregulation, but also in terms of effective competition, 
and other market institution variables. So we estimate a richer model in Table 2(c) to investigate 
the impact of these variables. This model is given by the error components model outlined 
earlier. 
The five variables that capture the changes in the institutional environment are the 
deregulation index, the probability of deregulation, effective competition, the years till start of 
retail competition and stranded cost recovery levels. An increase in deregulation (by one stage) 
increases real total R&D by 0.32 percent. The non-linear nature of the specification implies that 
the effect of deregulation on R&D levels is dependent on the base level of R&D
33. This implies 
that the higher the base level of research a firm is engaged in, the greater will be the effect of 
deregulation on its R&D budget. For example, consider two companies in 1997 - Texas Utilities 
Company with a real R&D expenditure of  12.8 million dollars and Maine Public Service 
Company, - with 0.006 million dollars and both at stage 1 of the deregulatory process in 1997. If 
deregulation increases by one stage, R&D increases by $4.03 million for Texas Utilities, whereas 
it increases by only $0.002 million for Maine Public Service Company. This is intuitively clear 
because a firm that performed very little research in the first place, will be less affected by 
changes in the regulatory structure that a firm with a large R&D budget. From Table 4(a)
34, we 
find that for the mean firm, R&D increases by 1.66 million dollars when deregulation progresses 
by 1 stage.  
                                                           
33 The coefficient is the semi-elasticity and the marginal effect is given by: δ(RD)/δ(Dereg) = β-hat.RD, where RD is 
evaluated at the mean or median and β-hat= .315 from Table 2(c).  
34 For Table 4(a) and (b), we do not calculate the elasticities because for most the market institution variables, a one 
percent increase does not have an economic meaning. 
  19The probability of deregulation has a negative coefficient implying that firms that have a 
greater expectation of deregulation decrease their R&D budget. A possible explanation is the 
unwillingness of firms to invest in research till some of the uncertainties involved in the 
deregulation process are resolved and a final market structure emerges. When the probability of 
deregulation increases by one percent
35, R&D expenditures decrease by half a percent or 2.6 
million dollars. Performing the same analysis as before, R&D expenditure for Texas Utilities 
decreases by 6.32 million, while that of Maine Public Service decreases by 0.003 million. 
The percentage of customers eligible for retail competition measures the "effective 
competition" in the state. In line with earlier predictions, increased competition implies an 
increase in R&D expenditures and a one percent increase raises R&D spending by 0.004 percent 
or $21,000 (evaluated at mean R&D). Another related variable is the number of years till start 
date of retail competition. Suppose two firms are in the same stage of deregulation - but one has 
10 years till retail competition starts and the other has 1 year, a positive coefficient implies that 
R&D declines as the retail competition date becomes closer, whereas a negative coefficient 
implies that firms increase research spending as the date draws near. In the basic model, the 
coefficient is positive but not significant, suggesting that this may not be an important factor in 
deciding R&D levels. In addition, the level of stranded cost recovery is not significant. Our basic 
models points to the varied impact of different institutional forces on a firm’s R&D expenditure. 
To study the magnitude of total effect we refer to Table 4(a). We find that when all the market 
institution variables change by one unit, R&D decreases by 0.92 million dollars or 0 .17 percent. 
The next set of variables relate to the financial health of the company and firm 
characteristics. A better the bond rating induces more R&D since a firm with higher bond rating 
                                                           
35 This probability lies between 0 and 1 and a one unit change is 0.1, which is equivalent to one percent. The 
effective retail competition is measured by the percentage of customers and lies between 0 and 100. 
  20has a better chance of borrowing money cheaply in the market and this may increase R&D. The 
size and type of the firm also influence R&D expenditures. The effect of size on R&D (as 
measured by the operating income) is different pre and post 1992. Before deregulation, the 
elasticity of R&D expenditure with respect to size is 0.964, implying that a one percent increase 
in the size of a company increases R&D by almost one percent. However after 1992 this 
elasticity declines to 0.735, implying that size becomes less important as a determinant of 
research after restructuring. The share of industrial sales in total generation positively affects 
R&D pre and post deregulation and a one percent increase leads to a 0.67 percent increase in 
spending
36. 
The share of purchased power is not a significant factor in explaining R&D in the 
regulated regime. However, post-deregulation it has a significant negative impact, with a one 
percent increase in this ratio leading to a 0.17 percent
37 decline in research spending. Thus when 
IOUs mostly purchase power rather than generate, they have less incentive to conduct R&D, 
especially in a market environment where they have to keep a close watch on their bottom line. 
The share of fossil fuel in the generation mix does not affect research spending. Last, we find 
that a more pro-active PUC induces greater R&D expenditures, as expected from earlier 
discussions. The model also includes a time trend that is negative and significant and year 
dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks. 
Section 4.2: Alternative Specifications 
In Table 3(a) we provide some sensitivity analysis for our basic model. Model 1 
estimates the same specification as the basic model, with resale share added. This variable 
denotes the sales for resale of a utility, i.e. the amount of power sold in the wholesale market. 
                                                           
36 Elasticity = δln(RD)/δln(Share) = β-hat. (Share evaluate at mean). β-hat=1.285 and Mean Share  = 0.519 
37 Post-Deregulation: β-hat=-0.546 and Mean Share  = 0.312 
  21Since the whole sale market was well under way to deregulation by 1993, this variable should be 
an important factor and we would expect utilities with a higher share of wholesale to invest more 
in R&D due to higher competitive pressures. We find that pre-1992, this variable does not affect 
spending, whereas post-1992, there is a significant positive impact on research spending. Except 
for a couple of variables all results remain unchanged. The percentage of eligible customers is 
now insignificant and the share of industrial customers is insignificant before 1992 and positive 
and significant post-1992. The latter may be because the resale share and the share of industrial 
customers may be picking up the same effect and are highly collinear. 
Model 2 adds a state fuel composition to the above specification. This dummy takes the 
value 1 if the share of gas and coal in electricity generation is greater than other fuels. This 
captures the generation technology in the state as this may influence research spending by 
companies. A greater use of fossil fuel in a state may imply a greater research spending to 
appease the environmental lobbies, as discussed earlier in the political economy discussion. We 
find that this is not validated and states with a higher coal and gas fuel share conduct less 
research. We also included separate dummies for coal, gas and hydro and again the coal and gas 
dummies are negative and significant (the results are not presented). The result is especially 
strong for the coal states. This may suggest that all else equal, states with a higher share of coal 
in their generation mix are those with less active regulators and hence the R&D push is not there. 
The last column of Table 3(a) estimates the basic model with state fixed effects to capture state-
level unobservables. We find that their inclusion does not fundamentally change any of the 
earlier results, especially on the institutional variables, except making the start date variable 
significant.  
  22Next, instead of taking 1992 to be the watershed year and observing pre and post 1992 
effects, we introduce three different interactions in Table 3(b). The first model comprises 
interactions of variables of interest with date of retail competition in each state, to directly 
capture the effect of retail competition on firm characteristics and R&D. The second includes 
interactions of firm characteristics with the deregulation index, to study how these variables 
affect R&D as deregulation progresses. The last model creates a deregulation dummy that takes 
the value 1 when the deregulation index is 1 or greater. 
From model 1 in Table 3(b), we find several differences from the basic model in Table 
2(c). First, the competition variable is not significant. Second, the regulator nature is not 
significant as the retail dates may already capture some of this effect, i.e. states with more pro-
active regulators would start retail competition faster than others. Third, none of the interaction 
terms are significant suggesting that the retail competition date does not have any significant 
impact of how these firm level variables behave. Fourth, size has the same effect before and after 
the retail competition date. The results from model 2, with interactions with the deregulation 
index, are very similar to the model 1, except that the regulator nature is positive and significant. 
When the interactions are done with the deregulation dummy (model 3), results are once again 
very similar to the basic model. The main difference is that the share of industrial sales has a 
much stronger effect than the basic model. This suggests that as deregulation progresses, utilities 
with a greater share of the wholesale market will increase R&D spending to gain an edge over 
competitors. But in all three specifications, a majority of the market and institutional variables 
behave as before, suggesting that our choice of 1992 as the break-point is indeed justified. 
Section 5: Conclusion 
  23In the recent years there has been a great deal of concern among industry analysts and the 
Department of Energy, about the apparent decline in R&D expenditure by the IOUs. The 
California Public Utility Commission has instituted a new public interest energy research 
program on the presumption that deregulation will adversely affect R&D. Our research points in 
a different direction. We find that although the process deregulation has adversely affected R&D 
investment by IOUs, it may be a transition phenomenon. Various facets of the institutional 
environment affect R&D expenditures in different ways. Greater deregulation and competition 
has a positive effect on R&D whereas a higher probability of deregulation adversely affects 
research spending. The start date for retail competition and level and policies for stranded cost 
recovery do affect spending. 
Combining the contradictory trends we conclude that once full deregulation takes place 
and the market becomes truly competitive, R&D expenditures may be less adversely affected 
than what is postulated by recent trends. It may be the uncertainty associated with the process 
that is adversely affecting research expenditures. With the start of effective competition, firms 
will very likely invest in research that gives them a competitive edge. We find that given a stage 
of deregulation, a firm invests more in R&D when there is effective competition in the market. 
Thus we hold that once the dust settles, and the companies are more confident about the nature of 
the emerging market structure, R&D expenditures will recover, at least for certain types of 
research. 
The nature of the firm has differential effects in the pre and post-deregulation periods. 
The size elasticity of R&D is near unity pre-1992 and slightly lower post-1992 suggesting that 
size affects R&D less after deregulation. Also, R&D expenditures are more elastic to changes in 
the share of industrial sales post-1992. A utility that purchases a greater part of the power it sells 
  24invests little in research post-deregulation. In addition firms located in states with pro-active 
regulators and those with higher bond ratings invest more in research activities. 
These findings suggest that when the uncertainty is resolved and full deregulation goes 
into effect, and there is effective competition in the market, R&D spending may increase from its 
current low level. One factor to remember is that, most likely, we will not observe the R&D 
expenditures of the past. If we assume that the regulators were maximizing social welfare when 
setting the level of R&D cost pass through, then R&D under the regulatory regime would be 
optimal. With competition, 'public interest' research, the benefits of which cannot be captured by 
any single firm, may decline - leading to expenditure levels below the regulated one. 
  However, common belief is that a portion of R&D was performed by the firm in 
accordance with the regulator's wishes. If we are willing to assume that Public Utility 
Commissions were not omniscient and their R&D decisions may not have maximized social 
welfare, then this decline may not decrease social welfare. Further analysis needs to be 
conducted on the decline and changing composition of R&D after 1992. This paper is a step 
towards understanding the dynamics of R&D spending when firms transition from a regulated to 
a market environment 
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  27APPENDIX TABLES 
TABLE 1(A): SUMMARY STATISTICS
First Stage: Sample: All Firms, 1989 – 1997(1110 obs.) 
 Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable: Decision to conduct R&D  -  -  0  1 
Regressors:      
Real Operating Revenues  1.22e+09 1.49e+09 4652657 8.44e+09 
Share of Generation in Total Sales  0.783  0.284  0.074  3.707 
Share of Hydro Electric Power in Generation  0.121  0.286  0  1 
Pending Merger  -  -  0  1 
PUC Nature  1.578  1.219  0  4 
 
Second Stage: Sample: Firms with Positive R&D only, 1989 – 1997 (881 obs.) 
  Mean SD  Min  Max 
Dependent Variable:      
Real Total R&D Expenditure (1996 dollars)  5264682 8989887 291.1  81900000 
Log (Real Total R&D Expenditure – 1996 dollars)  14.419 1.798  5.674  18.222 
Regressors:        
Deregulation Index  0.261 0.702 0  3 
Probability of Deregulation  0.244 0.336 0  1 
Start Date of Retail Competition  18.427 4.999  1  20 
% Customers Eligible for Retail Competition  17.123 36.702 0  100 
Stranded Cost Recovery  0.401  0.886  0  3 
Bond Rating  10.396  2.568  0  17 
Log (Real Operating Revenues)  20.629 1.020  17.857 22.857 
Share of Industrial Sales in Total Elec. Generation  0.520 0.131 0  0.799 
Share of Purchased Power  0.277 0.238 0  1 
Share of Fossil Fuel Generation  0.776 0.245 0  1 
Resale Share  0.192  0.180  0  1 
PUC Nature  1.603  1.222  0  4 
 
 
TABLE 1(B): DEREGULATION STATUS IN 1997





0 = No Activity 
 
7  Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, South Dakota 
1 = Investigations Ongoing 
or Orders and Legislation 
Pending 
 
30  Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
2 = Order Issued For Retail 
Competition 
 
2 Maryland,  Vermont 
3 = Legislation Enacted to 
Implement Retail Access 
 
11  California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island 
 
  28TABLE 1(C): DATES OF EFFECTIVE RETAIL COMPETITION
State Restructuring  Act 
that introduced 
competition 
Date when the 
Act was enacted 
Date when large or a portion 
of residential customers 
would get retail access 
Date when all 
customers would 
get retail access 
Arizona HB  2663  5/98  1/1/99  1/2001. 
California AB  1890  9/96  -  3/1998 
Connecticut RB  5005  4/98  1/2000  7/2000 
Illinois HB  362  12/97  10/99  5/2002 
Maine LD  1804  5/97  -  3/2000 
Maryland -  12/97  7/2000 7/2000 
Massachusetts -  11/97  -  3/1998 
Michigan -  6/97  3/98  1/2000 
Montana SB  390  4/97  7/98  7/2000. 
Nevada AB  366  7/97  -  12/1999 
New Hampshire  HB 1392  5/96  -  7/1998 
New Jersey  -  4/97  10/98  7/2000 
New York  -  5/96  1/98  - 
Oklahoma SB  500 4/97  -  7/2000 
Pennsylvania  HB 1509, HB 2286  12/96, 3/98  1/99  1/2001, 1/99 
Rhode Island  -  8/96  7/97  7/98 
Vermont -  12/96  1/98  12/1998 
Virginia HB  1172  4/98  1/2002  1/2004 
 
TABLE 1(D): STATUS OF ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURE REFORM, 1977
State  AL  AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL  GA  HI  ID 
Generic  Rt.  Hearings     *   * * *   * *   *  
FEA-Funded  Experi.     * * *   *            
Lifeline/Inverted  Rt.     *   *     *  *     * 
Time-of-Day  Rates       * *   *     * *     
State  IL  IN IA KS  KY  LA  ME  MD  MA  MI MN  MT  NE 
Generic  Rt.  Hearings  *        *  *       
FEA-Funded  Experi.            *      
L i f e l i n e / I n v e r t e d   R t .             *       
Time-of-Day  Rates  *  *        *  *    *   
State  NV  NH NJ  NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA  RI  SC 
Generic  Rt.  Hearings    *    *  *      *    
FEA-Funded  Experi.     *   *  *   *  *     *   
L i f e l i n e / I n v e r t e d   R t .              *     
Time-of-Day  Rates  *  * * * * * * *     *  *  
State  SD  TN TX UT VT VA WA  WV  WI WY     
Generic  Rt.  Hearings        *    *       
FEA-Funded  Experi.       *   *   *       
L i f e l i n e / I n v e r t e d   R t .                  
Time-of-Day  Rates  *     *  *   *  *       
Source: Anderson, Douglas D.  -  “Regulatory Politics and Electric Utilities”, Auburn House Publishing Company; Boston, 
Massachusetts, 1981 
  29TABLE  2(A): STAGE 1 - SELECTION EQUATION 
Dependent Variable is a Binary Index Function for Total R&D Expenditure 
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant  -0.388  (0.364) 
Real Operating Revenues   0.000000003  (0.0000000004) ** 
Share of Generation in Total Sales   0.184  (0.425) 
Share of Hydro Electric Power in Generation  -2.421  (0.536)  ** 
Pending Merger  -1.070  (0.341)  ** 
PUC Nature   0.773  (0.185)  ** 
Log Likelihood  -172.075 
Log σ
2
u  2.178 
Number of Observations   1168 
Note: This selection equation has been estimated by a random effects panel probit model. Range: 1989-1997 and 161 
utilities. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5 percent and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10 percent. 
 
TABLE 2(B): STAGE 2 - LEVELS EQUATION (DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE MODEL) 
Dependent Variable is Log (Positive Total R&D Expenditure) 
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
Variable Coefficient    Variable  Coefficient 
Control for Selection Bias     Firm Characteristics   
Predicted Prob. of Positive 
Outcome 
 13.54 (4.745) **    Bond Rating   0.157 (0.036) ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive 
Outcome Squared 
-21.50 (8.029) **    Log(Real Operating Rev.)   0.873 (0.104) ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive 
Outcome Cubed 
 11.29 (4.297) **    Share of Fossil Fuel 
Generation 
-0.057 (0.300) 
Difference-in-Difference Specification    Share of Industrial Sales in 
Total Electricity Generation 
 1.735 (0.547) ** 
Deregulation Dummy  -0.269 (0.014) **    Share of Purchased Power  -0.639 (0.264) ** 
Dummy for IOUs in Deregulated 
States 
 0.061 (0.204)    Regression Diagnostics   
Deregulation Dummy* Dummy 
for IOUs in Deregulated States 
-0.202 (0.114) *    σu  0.920 
Year Controls    σe  0.779 
Year  -0.005 (0.001) **    Fraction of Variance Due to 
Ui
 0.582 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes    R-Square   0.532 
      No. of Observations   886 
Note: The estimation technique is a random effects panel data model. Unbalanced panel. Range: 1989-1997. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5 
percent and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10 percent. The deregulation dummy takes the value 1 for year>=1993. The treatment group is IOUs 
in deregulated states. If a state  
  30TABLE 2(C): STAGE 2 - LEVELS EQUATION (BASIC MODEL) 
Dependent Variable is Log (Positive Total R&D Expenditure) 
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
Variable  BASIC MODEL 
Control for Selection Bias   
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome   15.06  (4.836)  ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome Squared  -22.46  (8.176)  ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome Cubed   11.15  (4.392)  ** 
Market Institution Variables   
Deregulation Index   0.315  (0.104)  ** 
Probability of Deregulation  -0.494  (0.278)  ** 
% Customers Eligible for Retail Comp.   0.004  (0.002)  * 
Years Till Start of Retail Competition   0.017  (0.013) 
Stranded Cost Recovery  -0.056  (0.062) 
Firm Characteristics   
Bond Rating   0.149  (0.034)  ** 
Log(Real Operating Rev.)   0.964  (0.105)  ** 
Share of Industrial Sales in Total Electricity Generation   1.285  (0.580)  ** 
Share of Purchased Power  -0.406   (0.310) 
Share of Fossil Fuel Generation   0.098  (0.304) 
Pro-Active State and Year Controls   
PUC Nature   0.132  (0.082)  * 
Year  -0.006  (0.001)  ** 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes 
Post-Deregulation Interactions   
Log(Real Operating Revenues) *Post 1992 Dummy  -0.129  (0.062)  ** 
Share of Ind. Sales in Total Elec. Gen. * Post 1992 Dummy   0.545  (0.443) 
Share of Purchased Power * Post 1992 Dummy  -0.546  (0.289)  * 
Regression Diagnostics   
σu  0.856 
σe  0.777 
Fraction of Variance Due to Ui  0.549 
R-Square   0.541 
No. of Observations   881 
Note: The estimation technique is a random effects panel data model. Unbalanced panel. Range: 1989-1997. The interaction terms 
denote how important each effect is post 1992. Pre-1992 - marginal effects are the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Post-1992: 
the marginal effects are: coefficient of variable + coefficient of interaction term if the interaction term is significant. Otherwise the 
explanatory variable has the same marginal effect pre and post 1992. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5 percent and ‘*’ denotes significance 
at 10 percent. 
  31TABLE 3(A): SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR THE BASIC MODEL 
Dependent Variable is Log (Positive Total R&D Expenditure) 
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 
Variable Model  1 
With Resale Share 
Model 2 
State Fuel Composition 
Model 3 
State Fixed Effects
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome   14.96  (4.827)  **   14.68  (4.818)  **   12.22  (4.916)  ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome 
Squared 
-22.44  (8.160)  **  -21.85  (8.147)  **  -18.37  (8.293)  ** 
Predicted Prob. of Positive Outcome 
Cubed 
 11.23  (4.383)  **   10.81  (4.377)  **   9.232  (4.443)  ** 
Deregulation Index   0.311  (0.104)  **   0.304  (0.103)  **   0.342  (0.106)  ** 
Probability of Deregulation  -0.495  (0.278)  **  -0.509  (0.277)  *  -0.576  (0.290)  ** 
% of Customers Eligible for Retail Comp.   0.003  (0.002)   0.004  (0.002)  *   0.004  (0.002)  * 
Years Till Start of Retail Competition   0.017  (0.013)   0.015  (0.013)   0.021  (0.013)  * 
Stranded Cost Recovery  -0.056  (0.062)  -0.032 (0.062)  -0.037  (0.064) 
Bond Rating   0.151  (0.034)  **   0.153  (0.034)  **   0.150  (0.038)  ** 
Log(Real Operating Revenues)   0.957  (0.104)  **   0.970  (0.104)  **   1.067  (0.105)  ** 
Share of Ind. Sales in Total Elec. Gen.   0.981  (1.102)   1.101  (1.101)   1.852  (0.574)  ** 
Share of Purchased Power  -0.424  (0.311)  -0.495  (0.311)  *  -0.349  (0.333) 
Share of Fossil Fuel Generation   0.097  (0.303)   0.167  (0.305)   0.425  (0.304) 
Resale Share  -0.294  (0.759)  -0.257  (0.757)  - 
State Fuel Composition Dummy  -  -0.262  (0.120)  **  - 
PUC Nature   0.134  (0.082)  *   0.134  (0.082)  *  - 
Year  -0.006  (0.001)  **  -0.006  (0.001)  **  -0.007  (0.001)  ** 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
State Fixed Effects   No   No   Yes 
Log(Real Operating Revenues)*Post 1992 
Dummy 
-0.119  (0.062)  **  -0.119  (0.062)  **  -0.112  (0.063)  * 
Share of Ind.  Sales in Total Elec. Gen. * 
Post 1992 Dummy 
 2.019  (0.832)  **   2.004  (0.830)  **   0.498  (0.447) 
Share of Purchased Power * Post 1992 
Dummy 
-0.453  (0.294)  -0.472  (0.294)  *  -0.592  (0.295)  ** 
Resale Share* Post 1992 Dummy   1.295  (0.621)  **   1.308  (0.620)  **  - 
σu  0.851   0.849   0.601 
σe  0.776   0.774   0.778 
Fraction of Variance Due to Ui  0.546   0.545   0.375 
R-Square   0.545   0.550   0.702 
No. of Observations   881   881   881 
Note: The estimation technique is a random effects panel data model. The panel is unbalanced with minimum observations per group=1 
and max=8. Range: 1989-1997. Pre-1992 - the marginal effects are the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Post-1992: the marginal 
effects are the coefficient of variable + coefficient of interaction term if the interaction term is significant. Otherwise the explanatory 
variable has the same marginal effect pre and post 1992. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5 percent and ‘*’ denotes significance at 10 percent. 
  32TABLE 3(B):INVESTIGATING INTERACTIONS – JOINT EFFECT OF RETAIL COMPETITION / 
DEREGULATION AND FIRM CHARACTERISTICS ON R&D EXPENDITURES 
Dependent Variable is Log (Positive Total R&D Expenditure) 
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis) 












Constant   15.48  (4.760)  **   13.79  (4.843)  **   14.87  (4.750)  ** 
Predicted Probability of Positive Outcome  -23.20  (8.097)  **  -20.42  (8.235)  **  -22.66  (8.076)  ** 
Predicted Probability of Positive Outcome 
Squared 
 11.45  (4.354)  **   10.01  (4.430)  **   11.32  (4.344)  ** 
Deregulation Index   0.347  (0.104)  **   1.671  (0.849)  **   0.320  (0.104)  ** 
Probability of Deregulation (1)  -0.587  (0.276)  **  -0.662  (0.276)  **  -0.562  (0.275)  ** 
Percent of Customers Eligible for Retail 
Competition 
 0.003  (0.002)   0.004  (0.002)  *   0.003  (0.002) 
Years Till Start of Retail Competition   0.019  (0.013)   0.013  (0.013)   0.018  (0.013) 
Stranded Cost Recovery  -0.086  (0.063)  -0.066  (0.062)  -0.072  (0.062) 
Bond Rating   0.154  (0.033)  **   0.147  (0.034)  **   0.152  (0.034)  ** 
Log(Real Operating Revenues)   0.885  (0.099)  **   0.945  (0.103)  **   0.817  (0.110)  ** 
Share of Industrial Sales in Total Elec. Gen.   2.039  (0.728)  **   1.549  (0.548)  **   5.558  (2.115)  ** 
Share of Purchased Power  -0.588  (0.338)  *  -0.577  (0.267)  **  -0.759  (0.642) 
Share of Fossil Fuel Generation   0.140  (0.299)   0.172  (0.304)   0.147  (0.306) 
PUC Nature   0.088  (0.088)   0.154  (0.082)  *   0.164  (0.083)  ** 
Year  -0.005  (0.001)  **  -0.006  (0.001)  **  -0.006  (0.001)  ** 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Log(Real Operating Revenues) 
*(Retail/Dereg/Dummy) 
 0.042  (0.027)  -0.056  (0.040)   0.099  (0.054)  * 
Share of Ind.  Sales in Total Elec. Gen. * 
(Retail/Dereg/Dummy) 
-0.812  (1.039)  -0.060  (0.381)  -4.223  (2.170)  ** 
Share of Purchased Power * 
(Retail/Dereg/Dummy) 
-0.392  (0.488)  -0.385  (0.174)  **   0.056  (0.088) 
σu  0.812   0.859   0.861 
σe  0.777   0.778   0.777 
Fraction of Variance Due to Ui  0.522   0.549   0.551 
R-Square   0.539   0.538   0.547 
No. of Observations   881   881   881 
Note: The estimation technique is a random effects panel data model. The panel is unbalanced with minimum observations per 
group=1 and max=8. Range: 1989-1997. Pre-1992 - the marginal effects are the coefficients of the explanatory variables. Post-
1992: the marginal effects are the coefficient of variable + coefficient of interaction term if the interaction term is significant. 
Otherwise the explanatory variable has the same marginal effect pre and post 1992. ‘**’ denotes significance at 5 percent and ‘*’ 
denotes significance at 10 percent. 





















  Mean   0.261   0.244  17.12  18.43   0.401    
  Coeff. (dlnRD/dx)   0.315  -0.494  0.004  0.017    -0.056 -0.175(%) 
  mfx (dRD/dx)  1.658475  -2.60091  0.02106      -0.921 ($) 
  Coeff. (dlnRD/dx)   0.311  -0.495  0.003    0.017 -0.056 -0.184(%)  Table 3(a) - 
Column 1  mfx (dRD/dx)  1.637415  -2.606175  0.015795      -0.953 ($) 
Coeff. (dlnRD/dx)   0.304  -0.509  0.004  0.015    -0.032 -0.201(%)  Table 3(a) - 
Column 2  mfx (dRD/dx)  1.60056  -2.679885  0.02106      -1.058 ($) 
Coeff. (dlnRD/dx)   0.342  -0.576  0.004  0.021  -0.037  -0.209(%)  Table 3(a) - 
Column 3  mfx (dRD/dx)  1.80063  -3.03264  0.02106  0.110565    -1.211 ($) 
 





















  Mean  0.261   0.244  17.12  18.43   0.401    
Table 2(c)  Coeff. (dlnRD/dx))  0.315          -0.494 0.004 0.017 -0.056  
  mfx (dRD/dx)  0.746865  -1.171274  0.009484      -0.415 
  Coeff. (dlnRD/dx))  0.311        -0.495 0.003 0.017 -0.056   Table 3(a) - 
Column 1  mfx (dRD/dx)  0.737381  -1.173645  0.007113      -0.429 
Coeff. (dlnRD/dx)  0.304          -0.509 0.004 0.015 -0.032   Table 3(a) - 
Column 2  mfx (dRD/dx)  0.720784  -1.206839  0.009484      -0.477 
Coeff. (dlnRD/dx))  0.342        -0.576 0.004 0.021 -0.037    Table 3(a) - 
Column 3  mfx (dRD/dx)  0.810882  -1.365696  0.009484  0.049791    -0.545 
Note: The bold numbers imply that the coefficients are significant at lest at the 10 percent level. The dollars are in millions.





TOTAL R&D EXPENDITURE BY IOUS FROM 1989-1997 






































CHANGING IOU R&D IN FIVE REPRESENTATIVE STATES 
 





































































CA NY IL MA FL
 
  35